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BUNDLE OF JOY: WHY SAME-SEX MARRIED COUPLES 
HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENTER INTO 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS  
Benjamin H. Berman* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
James and Ryan are a gay couple from New Orleans, Louisi-
ana.  They are both forty years old, have been married for five years, 
and decide that they are ready to expand their family.  The men want 
to use a gestational surrogate to have their first child.1  With the help 
of a friend, the couple finds Sarah, a healthy, 30-year-old woman 
who is also a resident of New Orleans.  During an interview, the men 
explain to Sarah that James and his lifelong friend Rachel will be the 
genetic parents of the couple’s child.  Sarah says she would be de-
lighted to help the men embark on their parenthood journey.  The 
couple and Sarah sign a contract in which the men agree that Sarah 
will carry their child to term.2  A few weeks later, an embryo is creat-
ed and then transferred to Sarah.3   
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2021; B.B.A., 
Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra University, 2018.  I would like to thank my 
grandmother, Carol Berman, my parents, Charles and Lisa Berman, and my sib-
lings, Jeremy Berman and Rebecca and Zach Feller, for their unconditional love 
and support through all my law school endeavors.  I would also like to thank my 
faculty advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz, my Note Editor, Mike Petridis, and the 
Touro Law Review staff for helping me produce my best work. 
1 Gestational Surrogacy (Surrogate Mother) Definition, THE WOLTERS KLUWER 
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (1st ed. 2012).  “Gestational Surrogacy” 
is defined as “the process by which one woman conceives, carries, and births the 
child of another woman or for another person to whom she will give the child after 
birth for care, apart from herself.” Id.  
2 Legal Aspects of Domestic Gestational Carrier Agreements, RESOLVE, 
https://resolve.org/what-are-my-options/surrogacy/legal-aspects-of-domestic-
gestational-carrier-agreements/ (last visited Sep. 14, 2020) (“[A] gestational carrier 
contract is an agreement between intended parents and a gestational carrier and her 
1
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With their plans set in motion, the men decide that they want 
to have a local family law attorney, Steven, look over their gestation-
al surrogate contract.  When they meet with Steven, he informs them 
that their contract is not enforceable under Louisiana state law.  Loui-
siana law bans compensated gestational surrogacy agreements for all 
couples.4  In addition, Louisiana only allows those “intended parents” 
who would use their own “gametes” to enter into altruistic gestational 
surrogacy agreements in the state.5  However, their legal headaches 
would not end there.  “Pre-birth parentage orders” are limited to the 
“intended parents” as defined by the surrogacy statute.6  This means 
that neither James nor Ryan would be listed as the child’s parent on 
her birth certificate.7  Instead, Sarah alone would be listed as the 
child’s mother.8  To establish their legal parentage, the men will be 
                                                                                                                                       
partner/spouse, if any.  These contracts can be compensated or uncompensated and 
are intended to detail the parties’ rights, obligations, intentions, and expectations in 
connection with their arrangement.”).  
3 Dr. Paul C. Magarelli, Embryo Transfer: What It Is, What to Expect, The Different 
Types, and More, CNY FERTILITY (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.cnyfertility.com/embryo-transfer/ (“An embryo transfer is the final 
stage in the In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) process where the fertilized egg—now an 
embryo—is placed in the woman’s uterus.”). 
4 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1 (2016) (“Compensation” means a payment of money, 
objects, services, or anything else having monetary value.  Compensation shall not 
include reimbursement of actual expenses, as provided for in R.S. 9:2720.5(B)(3), 
to the gestational carrier or payment for goods or services incurred by the intended 
parents as a result of the pregnancy and that would not have been incurred but for 
the pregnancy.”); § 9:2720 (C.) (“No person shall enter into a gestational carrier 
contract for compensation as defined in R.S. 9:2718.1 or that is not in compliance 
with all of the requirements of this Part.  Any such contract executed in the state of 
Louisiana or any other state shall be absolutely null and unenforceable in the state 
of Louisiana as contrary to public policy.”). 
5 Id. § 9:2718.1 (2) (“Gamete” means either a sperm or an egg.”); § 9:2718.1 (6) 
(“Intended parents” means a married couple who each exclusively contribute their 
own gametes to create their embryo and who enter into an enforceable gestational 
carrier contract, as defined in this Chapter, with a gestational carrier pursuant to 
which the intended parents will be the legal parents of the child resulting from an in 
utero embryo transfer.”). 
6 The Center for Surrogate Parenting walks you through Louisiana surrogacy law, 
LA. SURROGACY L. OVERVIEW, https://www.creatingfamilies.com/us/louisiana-
surrogacy-law-overview/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
7 Id. 
8 Richard Vaughn, Louisiana Surrogacy Bill Advances from Bad to Worse, Int. Fer-
tility L. Group, https://www.iflg.net/louisiana-surrogacy-bill-advances-from-bad-
2
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forced to partake in post-birth adoption proceedings.9  James and 
Ryan are outraged by the Louisiana legislature’s decision to make 
gestational surrogacy an arduous undertaking for same-sex married 
couples in the state.  They decide to sue Louisiana in federal court for 
violating their constitutional rights.  Their claim rests on the funda-
mental right to raise children, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.10  They also raise a claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.11  This Note will argue that 
Louisiana’s bans on a same-sex married couple’s ability to enter into 
either paid or altruistic surrogacy agreements are unconstitutional.  
The fundamental right to raise children should apply with equal force 
to same-sex couples who want to start their families by using a gesta-
tional surrogate.  Gay people should be recognized as a protected 
class and laws that discriminate against them on the basis of their 
sexual orientation, like Louisiana’s surrogacy statutes, should be held 
unenforceable.   
Section II of this Note will discuss the different approaches 
that states have taken with regard to enforcing gestational surrogacy 
agreements.  Section III will examine case law concerning a parent’s 
rights to the “care, custody, and control of their child” and the appli-
cation of those rights to a married couple’s decision to use a gesta-
tional surrogate.  Sections IV and V will discuss the landmark gay 
marriage Supreme Court decisions, focusing on how those cases ren-
der the disparate treatment of same-sex married couples unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses.  Section VI will analyze how a state’s 
legalization of gestational surrogacy and adoption of the Uniform 
Parentage Act are legislative actions that can effectively safeguard 
the rights of married same-sex citizens who choose to use a gesta-
tional surrogate.  Section VII will address the fundamental right of 
                                                                                                                                       
to-worse/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he surrogate is deemed 
the legal mother of the child, and the intended mother has no parental rights, even 
though the embryo may be the biological child of the intended mother and intended 
father.”).  
9 The Center for Surrogate Parenting walks you through Louisiana surrogacy law, 
supra note 6.  
10 U.S. CONST. amend. art. XIV, § 1. 
11 Id. 
3
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same-sex married couples to enter into gestational surrogacy agree-
ments under the United States Constitution.  
II. LEGALITY OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY  
Gestational surrogacy is governed by state law.12  There are 
three categories used to identify the likelihood of the state enforcing a 
gestational surrogacy contract.13  The three categories are “surrogacy-
friendly,” “surrogacy-unfriendly,” and surrogacy neutral.14 A state is 
viewed as surrogacy neutral when neither its statutes nor its caselaw 
makes clear whether a gestational surrogacy agreement would be en-
forced.15 
“Surrogacy-friendly” jurisdictions explicitly permit gestation-
al surrogacy contracts and protect the rights of both the intended par-
ents and the gestational surrogate.16  Illinois’ surrogacy laws, for ex-
ample, deem that the intended parent of a child born from a 
gestational surrogate is the legal parent of the child immediately upon 
the child’s birth.17  The purpose of establishing the intended parent’s 
pre-birth contractual parentage rights in a contract is to prevent a ges-
tational surrogate from asserting a custody claim once the child is 
born.18  Illinois law requires that a gestational surrogate understand 
her role as a mere carrier in the process by mandating that she obtain 
legal counsel for the agreement to be enforced.19   
A “surrogacy-unfriendly” state is a state that denies the en-
forceability of gestational surrogacy agreements.20  Michigan has de-
                                                          
12 Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-
information/surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited Sep. 27, 2020). 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 2003 ILL. HB 4962 § 15 (a) (2) (2005).  “The intended father shall be the father 
of the child for purposes of State law immediately upon the birth of the child.” Id. 
18 Id. § 15 (a) (5).  (“Sole custody of the child shall rest with the intended parent or 
parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”). 
19 Id. § 20 (a) (5).  (“She has undergone legal consultation with independent legal 
counsel regarding the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract and the potential 
legal consequences of the gestational surrogacy.”). 
20 Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 12.   
4
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termined that gestational surrogacy contracts violate state public poli-
cy.21  Currently, Michigan is the only state that falls into this catego-
ry.22  
Surrogacy-neutral states do not clearly define what, if any, 
protections are afforded to intended parents and gestational surro-
gates in the state.23  While there are no gestational surrogacy laws in 
Kentucky, for example, an intended parent in the state may still ob-
tain a pre-birth order if they are biologically related to the child.24  
Louisiana is another example of a state that has permitted surrogacy 
only under limited circumstances.25  These circumstances include 
when the agreement is altruistic in nature and the intended parents are 
a married opposite-sex couple.26   
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE “CARE, CUSTODY, 
AND CONTROL” OF A CHILD BY A PARENT 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Case Law 
In Troxel v. Granville,27 the Supreme Court affirmed the fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the “care, 
custody, and control of their children.”28  The case involved an un-
married couple, Brad Troxel and Tommie Granville, who had two 
daughters together.29  Brad and Tommie later separated but their 
children continued to have a relationship with Brad’s parents, Gary 
and Jennifer Troxel.30  Brad committed suicide and Tommie sought 
to limit her daughters’ time with their paternal grandparents.31  The 
Troxels responded by filing a visitation petition with the Washington 
                                                          
21 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.855 § (5) (LexisNexis 2020).  
22 Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 12.  The law in New York 
recently changed and it is no longer a surrogacy-unfriendly state. 
23 Id.  
24 Surrogacy Laws by State, LPG, https://connect.asrm.org/lpg/resources/surrogacy-
by-state?ssopc=1, (last visited Sep. 27, 2020).   
25 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720.1 (C.) (2016). 
26 Id.  
27 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
28 Id. at 66 
29 Id. at 60.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 60-61.  
5
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Superior Court, that was later granted by the Washington Supreme 
Court.32  The basis for the Troxels’ petition was a Washington stat-
ute.33  When Tommie appealed, the Washington Supreme Court 
found that the Troxels should not have been granted visitation 
rights.34  The court rested its decision on the Federal Constitution.35  
The Supreme Court granted the Troxels’ petition for certiorari.36 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed whether granting 
the Troxels’ visitation under the Washington statute would violate 
Tommie’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.37  The Court 
addressed this issue through its application of the substantive compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause.38  The Court noted that this substan-
tive component “provides heightened protection against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”39 
Tommie’s liberty interest here was the “care, custody, and control” of 
her children.40  Based on long-standing precedent, the Court deter-
mined that, under the Due Process Clause, this liberty interest applies 
to two important facets of the parent-child relationship.41   The first is 
a parent’s right to “establish a home and bring up children.”42  The 
second is a parent’s right to “control the education of their own [chil-
dren].”43  Essentially, both of these rights protect a parent’s ability to 
preside over the upbringing of their children.44  The Court reasoned 
that the Washington statute at issue infringed on the fundamental 
right of parents to raise their own children.45  The statute was uncon-
stitutional because it was “breathtakingly broad.”46  The law gave 
                                                          
32 Id.  
33 Id. (“[A]ny person [may] petition the court for visitation rights at any time.”) (cit-
ing Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 26.10.160(3) (1994))).  
34 Id. at 63.  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 65. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. (quoting Wash v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).  
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).  
43 Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 67.  
46 Id.  
6
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sweeping authority to third-parties to assert visitation claims.47  Fur-
ther, once a claim was asserted, Washington state judges had the au-
thority to subvert a parent’s will by ruling in favor of the visitation 
claim.48   
The Court determined that the Superior Court erred in grant-
ing the Troxels’ visitation petition under the statute.49  Finding a lack 
of “special factors” to warrant the State’s involvement in Tommie’s 
child- rearing choices, the Court noted that Tommie was a fit parent 
whose parentage decisions should have been afforded the presump-
tion of being in her children’s best interests.50  The Superior Court 
incorrectly looked to the children’s best interest by forcing Tommie 
to disprove that “visitation would be in the best interest of her daugh-
ters.”51  Finally, the Court pointed out that Tommie did not intend to 
entirely exclude her children’s paternal grandparents from their 
lives.52  The fact that Tommie agreed to “one day of visitation per 
month” proved to the Court that her proposal should have been rea-
sonable to the Superior Court.53  Tommie made this decision based 
on what she believed was right for her children.54  Considering these 
factors, the Court determined that enforcing the statute violated 
Tommie’s constitutionally protected parental decision to limit the 
Troxels’ visitation.55  The Court thus affirmed the Washington Su-
preme Court’s decision.56  
B. State Court Case Law 
P.M. v. T.B.57 is an Iowa case that also applied Troxel’s prin-
ciples of parentage rights to gestational surrogacy agreements.58  This 
case involved P.M. and C.M., a married couple who had children 
                                                          
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 68.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 69. 
52 Id. at 71.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 72. 
55 Id. at 75.   
56 Id. 
57 907 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 2018).  
58 See id.  
7
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from a prior marriage.59  The couple decided that they wanted to have 
their own baby together through gestational surrogacy since C.M. 
could no longer conceive.60  They advertised on Craigslist seeking a 
surrogate.61  T.B. and her husband D.B. responded to the advertise-
ment and set up a meeting with the Ms.62 The couples got along well 
in the beginning and came to an agreement that T.B. would “gestate 
two embryos fertilized in vitro with P.M.’s sperm and the eggs of an 
anonymous donor.”63  The contract stated that the Ms would adopt 
one of the babies in exchange for the Ms agreeing to pay for T.B.’s in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedure and her prenatal expenses.64  How-
ever, the relationship between the Ms and the Bs later deteriorated 
and communications between the parties stopped almost entirely.65  
T.B. lost one of the babies after childbirth and decided that she want-
ed to keep the other baby, Baby H.66  Although they were not in-
formed about the birth, the Ms suspected that the childbirth had oc-
curred and two months later, “filed a motion for an emergency ex 
parte injunction.”67  The district court ruled that the surrogacy agree-
ment was enforceable and that the Ms were therefore Baby H’s par-
ents.68 
The Iowa Supreme Court decided whether the enforcement of 
the surrogacy contract violated T.B.’s rights under the United States 
Constitution.69  The court noted that the Iowa legislature had affirmed 
its legislative stance that neither traditional nor gestational surrogacy 
agreements violated state law.70  The court also pointed out that ges-
tational surrogacy agreements in the state are presumed valid under 
the law.71  It was then determined by the court that the surrogacy 
agreement between the Ms and the Bs did not violate a state criminal 
                                                          
59 Id. at 525. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 526.  
65 Id. at 527.  
66 Id. at 528. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 529. 
69 Id. at 530.  
70 Id. at 533.  
71 Id. at 535.  
8
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statute that banned the sale of babies.72  The Ms did not violate the 
statute because they were paying T.B. for her services as a gestational 
carrier, and were not selling the baby.73  The court found that P.M. 
was the legal parent of Baby H because the surrogacy agreement was 
enforceable.74  The court reasoned that constitutional rights vested in 
the “biological and intended” parent of Baby H, and that no such 
rights should be conferred upon Baby H’s gestational carrier.75  Thus, 
the court determined that “P.M.'s undisputed status as the biological 
and intended father of Baby H” trumped any constitutional rights 
T.B. had over Baby H.76  The court therefore held that the Ms were 
the legal parents of Baby H.77    
Troxel reaffirmed that a parent’s ability to choose how to pro-
vide for the “care, custody, and control of their children” is the cor-
nerstone of the substantive due process rights to make familial deci-
sions.78  The Iowa Supreme Court in P.M. v. T.B. expanded on this 
foundation by providing that gestational surrogacy agreements are 
enforceable in Iowa.79  Substantive due process rights therefore 
should include entrusting intended parents, who are to be the unborn 
child’s legal parents, with the authority to make parental decisions on 
behalf of their unborn child. 
IV.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX 
MARRIED COUPLES 
A.  U.S. Supreme Court Case Law 
In Obergefell v. Hodges,80 the Supreme Court reviewed nu-
merous state court cases that banned same-sex marriage.81  The Court 
decided two issues.  The first issue was whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandated that, upon request, states must issue same-sex 
                                                          
72 Id. at 536.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 543.  
75 Id. at 542.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 543.  
78 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000). 
79 T.B., 907 N.W.2d at 543. 
80 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
81 See id.  
9
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couples marriage licenses.82  The second issue was whether, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, states that had not yet legalized same-sex 
marriage were required to affirm the validity of same-sex marriage 
licenses provided by the states that recognized same-sex marriage.83  
These issues implicated both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.84  The Due Process Clause 
will be discussed in this section.  The Equal Protection Clause will be 
discussed in the next section.  
The Court reasoned that four principles of opposite-sex mar-
riage applied with “equal force to same-sex marriage.”85  These four 
principles show that marriage is a fundamental right that should apply 
to same-sex couples.86  The first principle discussed is the importance 
of a person’s ability to choose whom he wants to marry.87  The Court 
noted that this decision is one of the most intimate decisions a person 
can make, comparing it to “choices concerning contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing.”88  The Court reasoned 
that the intimate nature of the decision entitled same-sex couples to 
the same dignity and respect as opposite-sex married couples.89  The 
second principle analyzed is the support provided by the institution of 
marriage to two committed people.90  The Court suggested that mar-
riage helps to assuage fears that no one will be there to care for them 
in their old age through offering the “hope of companionship.”91  
Such companionship, in the Court’s view, should not be denied to 
same-sex couples who deserve “the full promise of liberty” in their 
intimate associations.92   
The third principle is the role of marriage in protecting the 
rights of children and families and “draws meaning from related 
                                                          
82 Id. at 656. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 675.  
85 Id. at 665. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 666. 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 667.  
92 Id.  
10
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rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”93  The Court 
adeptly pointed out that, at the time of the oral argument in Oberge-
fell, “hundreds of thousands of children” were being brought up by 
same-sex couples.94  The children of these couples stood to benefit 
from the stability that a marriage relationship would give their par-
ents.95  And finally, the fourth principle is the notion that “marriage is 
a keystone of our social order.”96  The Court emphasized that mar-
riage helps to promote the well-being of our society.97  States have 
long been encouraging marital unions by linking rights exclusively to 
them.98  It was therefore unfair in the Court’s view for states to deny 
same-sex couples the opportunity to experience these benefits 
through their own unions.99  At the conclusion of his opinion, Justice 
Kennedy expressed his view on why it was essential for same-sex 
couples to be able to fully enjoy the institution of marriage in the 
United States of America.100  In the Justice’s eyes, “[n]o union is 
more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of 
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”101 
The Court determined that banning same-sex marriage was 
unlawful because the four principles and traditions of marriage apply 
equally to couples in same-sex unions.102  The Court thus held that 
same-sex marriage was a right protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.103   
B.  State Court Case Law 
In 2019, the Utah Supreme Court relied on Obergefell when 
addressing the issue of whether a married same-sex couple’s gesta-
tional surrogacy agreement was enforceable.  In In re Gestational 
                                                          
93 Id.   
94 Id. at 668.  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 669.   
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 670.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 681. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 670.  
103 Id. at 681.   
11
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Agreement,104  N.T.B. and J.G.M., a “married same-sex male cou-
ple,” entered into a gestational surrogacy contract with D.B. and 
G.M., an “opposite-sex married couple.”105  The couples asked the 
Utah district court to validate their agreement, but the court re-
fused.106  At issue was section 78B-15-803 of the Utah Code which 
limited the enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements to situa-
tions where “medical evidence shows that the intended mother is un-
able to bear a child or is unable to do so without unreasonable risk to 
her physical or mental health or to the unborn child.”107  The district 
court reasoned that “the word ‘mother’ and ‘her’ plainly refer to a 
woman.”108  The court concluded that since neither of the child’s in-
tended parents was a woman, the agreement between the parties vio-
lated Utah law.109  
The Utah Supreme Court considered whether the state statute 
that limited gestational surrogacy to opposite-sex couples was consti-
tutional.110  The court reasoned that the benefit of gestational surro-
gacy could not be enjoyed by same-sex couples in the state due to the 
statute.111  As a result, the court noted that the statute was effectively 
denying these couples from being able to participate in a right that 
was explicitly linked to marriage.112  However, this was not just an 
ordinary right, but a right that the court pointed out is “one of the 
most important benefits afforded to couples who may not be medical-
ly capable of having a biological child.”113  The court decided that the 
“intended mother provision” of the statute violated the “due process 
rights” guaranteed to same-sex married couples by the Federal Con-
stitution.114   
Obergefell ensures that married same-sex couples are not pre-
vented from enjoying any of the benefits that the state links exclu-
                                                          
104 2019 UT 40, ¶ 1, 449 P.3d 69 (Utah 2019).  
105 Id. at 73. 
106 Id. 
107 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-803 (LexisNexis 2020). 
108 In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, 73.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 74. 
111 Id. at 80 (explaining that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-803 (2020) violated Ober-
gefell).  
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 82.   
114 Id.  
12
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sively to marriage.  The reasoning in those cases applies to the gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements that Louisiana has rendered available 
exclusively to opposite-sex married couples.  Excluding same-sex 
married couples like James and Ryan from gestational surrogacy 
agreements is both unconstitutional and unfair.  This position was re-
flected in the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gestational 
Agreement. 
 
V.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX 
MARRIED COUPLES 
A.  U.S. Supreme Court Case Law 
In Pavan v. Smith,115  the Supreme Court affirmed its holding 
in Obergefell, maintaining that all married couples must be treated 
the same under the law.116  Pavan involved two married same-sex 
couples from Arkansas where one of each of the partners had given 
birth to a child through artificial insemination.117  The couples had 
each requested birth certificates that would list the names of both 
partners as their child’s parents.118  However, the Arkansas Depart-
ment of Health (“Department”) issued these couples birth certificates 
that contained only the name of the birth mother.119  The Department 
argued that it was following an Arkansas statute which stated that a 
birth certificate was exclusively meant to contain the names of a birth 
mother and her husband.120  The couples sued the Department, argu-
ing that the statute violated the Constitution.121  The Arkansas Su-
preme Court found for the Department, upholding the constitutionali-
ty of the statute.122  
The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, 
reasoned that the Arkansas statute was inconsistent with Obergefell 
                                                          
115 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam).  
116 See id.   
117 Id. at 2077.  
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
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because “it denied married same-sex couples access to ‘the constella-
tion of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s] linked to marriage.’”123  The 
Court also acknowledged the import of accurate birth certificates 
since the document is often used by parents for the purposes of mak-
ing decisions related to their child’s health and schooling.124  By 
providing defective birth certificates, the Arkansas statute compro-
mised the “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” of same-sex married 
couples.”125  Thus, the Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
judgment on equal protection grounds.126 
B.  State Court Case Law 
The Maryland case In re Roberto D.B.127 concerned the en-
forceability of a state statute that prevented a biological father from 
being listed as the father on his children’s birth certificates.128  The 
biological father, Roberto D.B., utilized in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
with “his sperm being used to fertilize eggs from an anonymous egg 
donor.”129  Two fertilized eggs were produced as a result of the pro-
cedure.130  Roberto contracted with a woman to act as a gestational 
carrier.131  On August 23, 2001, the carrier gave birth to twins.132  In 
Maryland, “[t]he medical records department of a hospital is required 
to submit information regarding births to the Maryland Division of 
Vital Records (“MDVR”), a part of the Maryland Vital Statistics 
Administration.”133  The MDVR then issues certificates of birth 
based on the information it receives from the hospital.134  It was hos-
pital policy to “report the gestational carrier as the ‘mother’ of the 
                                                          
123 Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015)) (alteration 
in original). 
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007). 




131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(a)(4)(iii).). 
134 Id. at 118.  
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child to the MDVR.”135  The hospital where the carrier gave birth, 
Holy Cross Hospital, complied with this policy and reported Rob-
erto’s carrier as the mother.136  Roberto and the carrier, however, did 
not want the carrier to be listed as the children’s mother.137  The car-
rier was not genetically related to the children and she did not want a 
legal parentage relationship to be established between herself and the 
children.138   
The two parties joined in a “petition to the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County” to declare Roberto the legal father of the chil-
dren.139  Additionally, they wanted the hospital to report just the fa-
ther’s name to the MDVR so that he could obtain accurate birth cer-
tificates for his children.140  The circuit court denied the petition and 
refused to change the birth certificates.141  The parties appealed to the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland.142 
The issue before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether 
the paternity statute “afforded equal protection of the law to men and 
women similarly situated” under the Maryland Equal Rights 
Amendment.143  Under the law, men were able to deny paternity but 
women were not able to deny maternity.144  This meant that a gesta-
tional surrogate, such as Roberto’s carrier, could not deny legal par-
entage of the child she carried despite having no genetic connection 
to the child.145  The court reasoned that, at the time the paternity stat-
ute was written, the legislature could not have anticipated the com-
monplace use of assisted reproductive technologies to have chil-
dren.146  The court reasoned that the statute on its face could be 
“[i]nterpret[ed] . . . to extend the same rights to women and maternity 
                                                          
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 120 (“[E]quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied 
because of sex.”) (citing Md. Dec. of R. art. 46 (1972))).  
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 122.  
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as it applies - and works quite well - to men and paternity.”147  In 
reaching its decision, the court also noted the lack of competing par-
enting interests in this case.148  The court explained that because 
Roberto was a fit parent, there was no reason to deny him the relief 
he wanted.149  The court thus reversed the Circuit Court of Montgom-
ery County’s judgment.150 
Under Pavan, it is unconstitutional for Louisiana to refuse to 
issue James and Ryan a birth certificate with their names listed as the 
parents of their child.  Louisiana is violating the rights guaranteed by 
the Equal Protection Clause by treating married same-sex couples 
differently from married opposite-sex couples.  In order to rectify the 
issue, Louisiana must amend its gestational surrogacy statutes, fol-
lowing the holding articulated by the Maryland court in In re Roberto 
D.B. when it recognized that the child’s intended parent should be the 
child’s legal parent.151  The new Louisiana statutes must include 
same-sex couples in the definition of “intended parents,” which 
would then legally permit same-sex couples to enter into gestational 
surrogacy agreements.  
C.  The Equal Protection Clause Test  
When a claim is brought under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must first show that the stat-
ute at controversy is either discriminatory on its face or is facially 
neutral but has a discriminatory effect and was passed with a discrim-
inatory intent.152  By proving discrimination, the plaintiff establishes 
a classification.153  Suspect classification typically includes race, reli-
gion, or national origin.154  Quasi-suspect classification generally in-
                                                          
147 Id. at 125.  
148 Id. at 130.  
149 Id. at 131. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Cassidy Heiserman, Punishing Indigency: Why Cash Bail is Unconstitutional 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, DREXEL L. REV.: BLOG (Sept. 9, 2020), 
https://drexel.edu/law/lawreview/blog/overview/2020/September/cash-bail/.  
153 Id.  
154 Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, UMCK.EDU, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2021).  
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cludes gender or sex.155  Non-suspect classification is everything else, 
including age, wealth, or disability.156   
Next, based on the discrimination, the court will determine 
what level of scrutiny should apply.157  Strict scrutiny applies to stat-
utes that affect suspect classes.158  In order to pass strict scrutiny, the 
government defendant must show that the statute achieves a compel-
ling purpose and that no non-discriminatory alternatives exist.159  The 
factors that determine suspect classification of a group include the 
immutability of the trait that leads to classification, the political pow-
er of the group, the existence of a history of discrimination against 
the group, and whether prejudice continues to hold the group back 
from progress.160   
 Intermediate scrutiny applies to statutes that affect quasi-
suspect classes.161  The statute at controversy passes intermediate 
scrutiny when the government defendant can show that the statute ac-
complishes an important purpose and that the purpose can be 
achieved only through compliance with the statute.162   
Rational basis applies to statutes that affect non-suspect clas-
ses.163  The rational basis test requires that the plaintiff prove that the 
statute at controversy is not “rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest.”164  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has been in-
clined to apply a heightened rational basis review, known as rational 
basis “with a bite,” to cases that involve discrimination against the 
gay community.165  Under this theory, the Supreme Court has found 
                                                          
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Heiserman, supra note 152.  
158 Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 154.  
159 Heiserman, supra note 152. 
160 Suspect Classification, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).  
161 Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 154.  
162 Heiserman, supra note 152. 
163 Id.  
164 Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scruti-
ny’s Compelling- and Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (2016).  
165 Rational Basis Test with Bite, UMCK.EDU, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rationalbasiswbite.htm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2021).  
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that state statutes intended to harm gays never serve a “legitimate 
governmental interest” and are therefore unenforceable.166   
VI.  STATE LEGALIZATION OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
AGREEMENTS 
A.  Uniform Parentage Act 
The Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) is a law adopted in 1973 
by all the states to create “a way for the courts to identify a child’s 
legal parents, regardless of marital status.”167  In 2002, the UPA was 
revised to recognize gestational surrogacy agreements.168  Following 
Obergefell, the UPA was again modified in 2017.169  One of the new 
provisions “add[ed] a rule for the states to establish a de facto paren-
tal status of a legal parent who is not biologically related to the 
child.”170  The goal of updating the UPA was to protect the interests 
of children who are members of modern families.171  States are not 
required to adopt the UPA’s revisions.172   
                                                          
166 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  “If the constitutional conception of 
“equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.” Id. at 634 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534).  United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).  “DOMA seeks to in-
jure the very class New York seeks to protect.  By doing so it violates basic due 
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government . . . In 
determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, 
“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’” especially require careful considera-
tion.”  Id. at 769-770 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633).  
167 Melissa Heinig, What Is the Legal Definition of a Parent Under the Uniform 
Parentage Act?, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-
info/family-law/paternity/legal-definition-parent-under-uniform-parentage-act.html.  
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. The states that have adopted the 2017 provision include California, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington.  The 2017 provision has been introduced in the 
Connecticut, Maine, and Pennsylvania legislatures.  2017 Parentage Act, UNIF. L. 
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Feb. 
27, 2021).   
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Across the country, advocates for gestational surrogacy have 
been fighting passionately for states to reform their antiquated par-
entage laws to ensure equality for all married couples.173  The advo-
cates’ efforts have focused on lobbying states both to legalize gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements and to codify the vesting of legal 
parentage rights for intended parents, regardless of a parent’s sexual 
orientation.174  As a direct result of this push, Rhode Island decided it 
was time to embrace the UPA’s revisions by adopting The Rhode Is-
land Parentage Act in January 2021.175  This law allows any married 
couple who intends to have a child through the use of a gestational 
surrogate to be able to obtain a parentage order.176  A parentage order 
states who the intended parents are with an affirmation that all par-
entage rights will vest exclusively in the intended parents when the 
child is born.177  Prior to the Rhode Island Parentage Act, state law 
made it cumbersome for intended parents who were not the biological 
parents of their children to establish their legal parentage.178  Now, 
the legal parentage process has been revised for the first time in forty 
years to reflect the paradigm shift that families can take on various 
forms.179  On the adoption of the Act, United States Secretary of 
Commerce and former Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo stated 
that “[n]o parent should have to jump through hoops to receive legal 
recognition because of their sexual orientation or the circumstances 
of their child's birth.  The Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act en-
shrines into law our belief in the validity of all paths to 
parenthood.”180 
                                                          
173 Bethany Bump, Advocates call for New York to Legalize Gestational Surrogacy, 
TIMES UNION (Mar. 6, 2019) https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Advocates-
call-for-New-York-to-legalize-13667032.php (“More than three dozen states have 
legalized the practice.”).  Gestational surrogacy agreements are legal in New York 
as of February 2021.  N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 5-C (Consol. 2021).  
174 Bump, supra note 173.  
175 Press Release, State of Rhode Island Gen. Assembly, Rhode Island Parentage 




176 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-708 (2020). 
177 Id.  
178 See Press Release, State of Rhode Island Gen. Assembly, supra note 175.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
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B.  Other State Legislative Action  
New York has also recently taken a stance towards expanding 
equality for same-sex married couples in the state, as evidenced by its 
adoption of the Child-Parent Security (“Act”).181  The law was passed 
in April, 2020 and went into effect on February 15, 2021.182  The Act 
legalizes both altruistic and paid gestational surrogacy agreements 
while putting protections in place to safeguard the rights of the gesta-
tional surrogate herself.183  Further, the Act seeks to help intended 
parents more easily establish their legal parentage rights.184  The par-
entage rights are established by eliminating the requirement for adop-
tion proceedings, installing a mandate that gestational surrogates re-
linquish any parentage claims, and “establishing the legal rights of 
children born via assisted reproduction.”185  New York’s reform is 
monumental because it breaks down many of the barriers that 
LGBTQ+ individuals and couples have faced when they wanted to 
start a family in the state.186  Previously, gestational surrogacy 
agreements were banned in the state as they violated the law.187  
Governor Andrew Cuomo proclaimed in his 2020 State of the State 
that New York’s ban on gestational surrogacy was “based in fear not 
love.”188  He conveyed his belief that it is “past time New York help 
LGBTQ+ couples and people struggling with fertility use common-
place reproductive technology to start families.”189  
                                                          
181 Harriet Newman Cohen & Tim James, Surrogacy Agreements Approved by New 
York...With Provisions, LAW.COM (July 24, 2020, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/24/surrogacy-agreements-
approved-by-new-york-with-provisos/?slreturn=20200925192824; see also N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 5-C (Consol. 2021). 
182 Cohen & James, supra note 181.  
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Unveils 16th 
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VII. ANALYSIS 
A. James and Ryan Have a Constitutional Right to 
Enter into A Gestational Surrogacy Agreement in 
Louisiana Under the Substantive Due Process 
Clause  
Under Troxel, James and Ryan have the constitutional rights 
as fit intended parents to make decisions concerning the “care, custo-
dy, and control of their child.”190  As a result, it should fall within 
their rights to make one of the most fundamental of all parentage de-
cisions, deciding how their child will be carried to term.  Louisiana 
should thus recognize the use of a gestational surrogate by a same-
sex married couple as a legitimate exercise of parental authority by 
the intended parents.  
Further, James will be the biological father of the child in ad-
dition to being an intended parent with Ryan.  In P.M. v. T.B., the 
Iowa Supreme Court determined that a biological parent’s rights over 
his child are paramount and will trump any third-party parentage 
claims.191  This principle supports the notion that James, who is hav-
ing a child that will be genetically related to him, should be given 
control to decide the way his child is to be carried to term.  
The defining principle of the landmark gay marriage decisions 
is that all married couples must be able to enjoy the same benefits 
that the institution of marriage provides.  The right to enter into a ges-
tational surrogacy agreement as a married intended parent is a fun-
damental liberty interest because it concerns the family unit.  Louisi-
ana’s surrogacy laws fail to guarantee due process of law for all 
married couples in the state.  The “gametes” language contained in 
the statute implies that only opposite-sex married couples may use an 
altruistic gestational surrogate.  This is inconsistent with all the tradi-
tions and principles of marriage that the Court in Obergefell found 
apply with equal force to same-sex marriage.  First, it interferes with 
a person’s right to choose whom to marry.192  Marriage, as Justice 
Kennedy pointed out, is often used as a building block to establish a 
                                                          
190 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000). 
191 P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 543 (Iowa 2018). 
192 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015). 
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family with the person one loves.193  Thus, by denying same-sex mar-
ried couples the ability to use an altruistic gestational surrogate, Lou-
isiana is wrongfully devaluing the marriage relationship between two 
persons of the same sex.  As the laws are written, same-sex married 
couples are restricted from starting a family, unlike opposite-sex mar-
ried couples.  Next, the laws deny same-sex married couples “full 
liberty” because it treats their marriages as lesser than those marriag-
es between opposite-sex couples.  Third, the laws harm the interests 
of children because it makes it harder for same-sex parents to estab-
lish their rights as the legal parents of their children.  Legal parentage 
is essential for a parent to make all the most important childrearing 
decisions, including schooling and healthcare.  And finally, the laws 
deny those benefits to same-sex married couples that the state has ex-
plicitly linked to marriage.  
Louisiana’s unlawful ban on same-sex married couples’ use 
of a gestational surrogate is similar to the Utah surrogacy statute that 
the Utah Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in In re Gestation-
al Agreement.194  Both statutes have terms that imply that the rights 
contained within the statute only apply to opposite-sex couples: the 
obscure “gametes” language in Louisiana limiting who the “intended 
parents” can be and the term “intended mother” in Utah.  When the 
legality of a surrogacy agreement is conditioned on marriage, as the 
Utah Supreme Court noted, it is categorically unfair for the law to 
exclude same-sex married couples.  
B. James and Ryan Have a Constitutional Right to 
Enter into A Gestational Surrogacy Agreement in 
Louisiana Under the Equal Protection Clause 
Louisiana’s surrogacy laws discriminate against James and 
Ryan on the basis of their sexual orientation.  The statutes place a bi-
ological restriction on who can enter into gestational surrogacy 
agreements in the state.  The laws punish James and Ryan as a mar-
ried same-sex couple because they are biologically unable to provide 
their own “sperm” and “egg.”  Because the laws therefore implicitly 
limit gestational surrogacy to married opposite-sex couples, James 
                                                          
193 Id. at 681.  
194 See supra Section IV.B. 
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and Ryan can successfully assert that the laws are discriminatory on 
their face.   
Sexual orientation is an immutable trait.195  Although sexual 
orientation, unlike race, cannot be perceived visually, people who are 
gay have a trait that is distinguishable from that of the general popu-
lation.196  This trait is their attraction to members of the same-sex.197  
Because all gay individuals thus have a defining characteristic, as op-
posed to other groups, such as close relatives, they are a discrete 
group with an immutable trait.198  Recent developments show that the 
gay community has made strides towards increasing its political in-
fluence in the country.  For example, in February 2021, the United 
States Senate confirmed the first openly gay presidential cabinet ap-
pointee, Pete Buttigieg.199  However, the gay community’s lobbying 
power over government is still miniscule and far more rudimentary in 
comparison to corporate forces.200  Gays’ “struggle is not for special 
tax exemptions, but rather for simple human dignity.”201  Even with 
the successes of marriage equality and representation in government, 
the furtherance of basic equality alone does not equate to substantial 
political power on the part of the gay community.202  A primary rea-
son for the curtailment of the gay community’s progress is the history 
of discrimination that the community has faced.  Over the years, gays 
have suffered “numerous grisly hate crimes and deplorable employ-
                                                          
195 Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, THE HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-
and-definitions (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).  
196 Brett Parker, What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual Orientation-Based 
Classifications Receive?, STANFORD POL. (Jan. 19, 2015), 
https://stanfordpolitics.org/2015/01/19/level-legal-scrutiny-sexual-orientation-
classifications/.  
197 Id.  
198 Id.; see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (“Close relatives… do not exhibit 
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete 
group.”).  
199 Oliver O’Connell, Pete Buttigieg becomes first gay cabinet member confirmed 
by Senate in historic vote, THE INDEP. (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/pete-buttigieg-
openly-gay-cabinet-member-senate-b1796535.html.  
200 Parker, supra note 196.  
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
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ment injustices.”203  In addition, the gay community has been victim-
ized by legislation such as bans on same-sex marriage and “openly 
serving in the military.”204  Discriminatory acts taken against the gay 
community have been fueled by prejudice.  There exists no societal 
necessity to treat the gay community differently from any other.205  
The anti-gay movement therefore falls back on hateful stereotypes 
regarding the “immorality of homosexuality.”206   These moral preju-
dices still run rampant in certain influential circles, hurting the ongo-
ing struggle for gay rights and equality.207  For these reasons, sexual 
orientation should be classified as a suspect class.208   
Because James and Ryan should be considered members of a 
suspect class, strict scrutiny should apply against Louisiana’s gesta-
tional surrogacy laws.  Under strict scrutiny, Louisiana would have to 
prove that its gestational surrogacy statutes achieve a compelling 
purpose and that no non-discriminatory alternatives exist.  Louisiana 
would fail at demonstrating a compelling purpose.  The state would 
likely argue that the statutes should be enforced as written because 
they help to promote the traditional family unit and the children’s 
well-being.  This is not a compelling state interest because the Su-
preme Court reiterated in Pavan the notion that such moral arguments 
do not affect the law.  Louisiana must recognize that the Federal 
Constitution protects married couples from being barred from the 
benefits of marriage on the basis of sexual orientation.  The state has 
linked gestational surrogacy to marriage and cannot therefore deny 
                                                          
203 Id.  
204 Id.  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which allowed for the discharge of outed gay ser-
vicemembers, was repealed on December 22, 2010.  Ali Rogin, How Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell has affected LGBTQ service members, 10 years after repeal, PBS (Dec. 
22, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-dont-ask-dont-tell-has-
affected-lgbtq-service-members-10-years-after-repeal.  
205 Id.  
206 Id.  
207 Evelyn Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, THE S. POVERTY 
L. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2010/18-anti-gay-groups-and-their-propaganda.  (“These groups’ influence 
reaches far beyond what their size would suggest, because the “facts” they dissemi-
nate about homosexuality are often amplified by certain politicians, other groups 
and even news organizations.”). 
208 The standards for sexual orientation and gender should be the same.  Gender 
should also be considered a suspect classification based on immutable characteris-
tics.  
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access to this form of procreation to same-sex married couples for a 
non-compelling reason.  A feasible non-discriminatory alternative al-
so exists.  Louisiana merely has to change its surrogacy statutes to 
clearly reflect that all married couples may use a gestational surro-
gate.  Because Louisiana lacks a compelling purpose and has a non-
discriminatory alternative, its surrogacy laws do not survive strict 
scrutiny.209 
Currently, the Supreme Court does not recognize sexual ori-
entation as a suspect class.210  However, under the current standard, 
which is rational basis review “with a bite,” the statutes still fail.211  
The statutes fail because they can be classified as anti-gay legislation.  
They were passed to deny gay couples their dignity to start their 
family with the person they love.  Such “animus” does nothing to fur-
ther a legitimate interest of the state.212  Instead, the hostility perpetu-
ated by the statutes merely serves to hinder the progress of same-sex 
couples being treated the same as opposite-sex couples by society.  
There is thus no rational basis for Louisiana’s surrogacy statutes.213  
The Louisiana statutes present an additional dilemma by pre-
venting the same-sex parents of a child born from gestational surro-
gacy from being listed as the child’s parents on her birth certificate.  
The state should look to the holding of the Maryland case In re Rob-
erto D.B. by not creating a parentage dispute between an intended 
parent and a gestational carrier when an issue between the parties did 
not exist in the first place.  Just like the carrier in Roberto, Sarah does 
not want to be listed as the mother of James’s and Ryan’s child.  
Thus, when there is no parentage dispute in a gestational surrogacy 
situation, Louisiana should list the intended same-sex parents on their 
children’s birth certificates as they would for opposite-sex parents.  
This would drastically smooth the process of establishing legal par-
                                                          
209 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
210 Parker, supra note 196.  
211 Rational Basis Test with Bite, supra note 165.  
212 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, 
even this conventional inquiry… Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with 
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but 
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
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entage and will give same-sex parents the ease of mind they need 
when their child is born. 
C. Louisiana Should Adopt the Uniform Parentage 
Act 
In addition to reforming its gestational surrogacy statutes, 
Louisiana should adopt the 2017 provision of the Uniform Parentage 
Act.  The current surrogacy laws show that the state is not yet on the 
path to accepting same-sex married couples as equal to opposite-sex 
married couples.  As discussed, this presents a major problem for 
same-sex married couples who wish to have children and exercise 
their right to have a family.  Adopting the revised Uniform Parentage 
Act would transform Louisiana’s current approach by ensuring the 
protection of the fundamental rights of its LGBTQ+ citizens on the 
state level.  It thus behooves Louisiana to adopt policies that encour-
age acceptance and equal treatment over exclusion and rejection.  
 
 
D. Congress Should Pass Legislation to Establish A 
National Framework for Uniform Access to 
Gestational Surrogacy 
In her Article in the UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Pol-
icy, Michelle Elizabeth Holland suggests that “[f]ederal law address-
ing gestational surrogacy should also be established in order to pro-
tect individuals from states that seek to limit or outlaw gestational 
surrogacy.”214  Federal regulation of gestational surrogacy would be 
beneficial as it could remove the limitations that certain “surrogacy 
neutral” and “surrogacy unfriendly” jurisdictions, including Louisi-
ana, have put in place to gatekeep the process.  Congress could re-
quire that gestational surrogacy be available to both opposite-sex and 
same-sex married couples “while providing states the opportunity to 
regulate its practice as they see fit.”215  For instance, the states should 
still be able to control whether the agreements can be altruistic, paid, 
                                                          
214 Michelle E. Holland, Article, Forbidding Gestational Surrogacy: Impeding the 
Fundamental Right to Procreate, 17 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 1, 26 (2013).  
215 Id. at 26-27.  
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or if either option is permitted.  This approach represents the best so-
lution to the problem because it ensures that protections are codified 
on the federal level for intended same-sex parents while still respect-
ing state sovereignty.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The ability for James and Ryan to enter into a gestational sur-
rogacy agreement in Louisiana is protected by the Substantive Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled that substantive due 
process protects a parent’s right to make decisions for their children.  
This right extends to unborn children because even a child that is not 
born can have at least one intended parent who is biologically related 
to her, like James.  Courts have given such intended parents the right 
to make decisions on the unborn child’s behalf.  Equal protection 
demands that same-sex and opposite-sex married couples are treated 
the same under the law.  Louisiana’s surrogacy statute violates this 
right by precluding same-sex married couples from using a gestation-
al surrogate.  It is therefore necessary for the state to reform its surro-
gacy laws so that it can pass constitutional muster and finally recog-
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